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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ROMNEY LUMBER COMPANY, a 
corporation, and BOARD OF EDU-
CATION of SALT LAKE CITY, a 
public corporation, et al., Case Number 
Defendant(s) and Added 8469 
Defendant, Third Party 
Plaintiff(s) and Respondents, 
-vs.-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPLELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(A) Statement of Facts as to the Pleadings: 
This was an action to quiet title to certain real prop-
erty situate in Salt Lake City and County, (Rec. 1-2) 
brought by plaintiff, Rennold Pender, under date of May 
7th, 1952, against, as originally filed, the Romney Lum-
ber Company, a corporation, and Salt Lake County, a 
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municipal corporation, as defendants (Rec. 1-2). Later, 
the defendant, Romney Lumber Company filed a third 
party complaint against the State of Utah (Rec. 27-29), 
pursuant to motion therefore (Rec. 26) and order of the 
Court so permitting (Rec. 32). Answers to the complaint 
(Rec. 4-5, 11-12), and to the Third Party Complaint (Rec. 
38-40), were filed on behalf of the various defendants and 
the State of Utah. Motion to substitute as a defendant, 
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City, a public cor-
poration, in the stead of Romney Lumber Company, 
whose interest the former had acquired was thereafter 
made (Rec. 41), and the Court (Rec. 43), entered an 
order "adding" the Board of Education as a defendant. 
Salt Lake County, a municipal corporation, later dis-
claimed, (Rec. 80) any title to the above described prem-
ises. Upon motion for summary judgment (Rec. 48), 
made on behalf of defendant, Board of Education of Salt 
Lake City, the Court (Rec. 77-78), entered judgment in 
its favor that it was owner of the premises in dispute, 
quieted its title against plaintiff, and dismissed the plain-
tiff's complaint for similar relief as to quieting title in 
him. Fr01n such judgment and decree, plaintiff Pender 
appealed (Rec. 77 -78) to this Court. 
(B) Statement of Facts As To lJfaterial Events: ___ _ 
The land involved in the dispute, in Salt Lake City 
and County, Utah, is more fully described in two different 
ways, i.e.: 
Lots 16 and 17, Block 13, Five Acre Plat "C", Big 
Field Survey, in Section 16, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
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and 
Lot 4, Block 13, of Section 16, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
(See Rec. 1, 12, 23, 30, 65-69, 77, 80, Exhibit "1"), .and this 
fact is mentioned in order that the Court in examining 
any matter pertaining thereto may avoid any misunder-
standing as to the description ( s) of the tracts involved. 
Plaintiff's title is deraigned through a series of 
deeds, as shown in the abstract of title (Exhibit 1) dating 
back to the Surveyor-General's survey certificate dated 
February 28th, 1868 and recorded March 9th, 1868, show-
ing possession then to have been in one John Prye, and 
title passes through intermediate conveyances passing 
title and possession down to the plaintiff herein, Rennold 
Pender. (Later mention of other earlier bases for title, 
obviates detailed mention at this point of same, but, re-
liance upon them is not waived because not here set out.) 
The realty in question was apparently never patented 
to the holders by the United States, although application 
filed by the plaintiff Pender in 1952, (Rec. 51-52), was 
rejected, as to further proceedings, until any adverse 
claim of the State of Utah thereto was eliminated. This 
suit followed for that purpose. 
Title of the defendant, Board of Education of Salt 
Lake, is deraigned through a conveyance from Romney 
Lumber Company (Rec. 41, Exhibit 1, pages 83-4), which 
latter corporation, in turn claims under an alleged patent 
from the State of Utah to the ground in question, said 
patent being dated July 19, 1943, and recorded August 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7th, 1943 (Exhibit 1, Page 25). The Board of Education 
was a taker with notice of the pendency of plaintiff's suit, 
when securing conveyance to itself of said property on 
May 5th, 1955 (Exhibit 1, Page 83-4) as pendency of suit 
was set out in said deed to it, and, since the lis pendens 
filed by the plaintiff, (Exhibit 1, page 82), had already 
been on record since 1\{ay 6th, 1953. 
No claim of adverse possession by the Board of Edu-
cation of Salt Lake andjor its predecessor, Romney Lum-
ber Company, by reason of any alleged ownership and 
possible possession and payment of taxes since date of 
the purported State patent arises, since, in .answers to 
interrogatories made by the Romney Lumber Company 
(Rec. 34, Paragraphs V, VI, answering interrogatories 
of plaintiff numbered 7, 8, 9), it does not claim title by 
adverse possession or usage of the tract, or any part, 
since inception of its alleged title. 
The controversy involved in the litigation arises 
over whether or not the ground in question as part of a 
Section 16 area, is, or ever became property of the State 
of Utah, by virtue of the enabling act, Section 15 of the 
Organic Act of 1850, creating the etah Territory, or 
otherwise, so, that the State of l~tah, could by conveyance 
or patent convey .any title to Romney Lumber Company; 
or, as opposed to the State's claim on the basis of a school 
section, whether the undisturbed possession and usage 
of the ground of the plaintiff and his predecessors for 
smnething like 84 years, as shown by the .abstract: and, 
as disclosed by an old plat of the .area, filed with the 
Pioneer Plats in Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
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(Rec. 66-67), there was a settlement of the area in ques-
tion prior to the first official survey of the land involved 
herein, so as to antedate September lOth, 1856, the date 
of said survey (Rec. 50), which, settlement, would be 
sufficient, as hereinafter set forth in the argument, under 
the various applicable land laws of the United States, 
relating to school grants, to prevent any title of the Terri-
tory or State of Utah attaching thereto, as a school grant 
of that p.art of a Section 16. Other material facts con-
cerning the issues will be set forth during the course of 
the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
SINCE FACTUAL MATTERS ARE INVOLVED, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE MATTER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
QUIETING TITLE IN FAVOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION OF SALT LAKE, INSTEAD OF QUIE'TING TITLE IN 
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE FACTUAL MATTERS ARE INVOLVED, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE MATTER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, 
in pertinent part, that: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith, if the pleading, depositions, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." - Summary Judg-
ment. 
If any genuine issue of fact exists, the court should 
not determine the matter on motion. Or, as said in Young, 
et al v. Felnoria, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 244 Pacific 2d, 862 
(page 863): 
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is 
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the 
motion [for summary judgment] should be de-
nied." 
In accord, see R. J. Daum Canst. Co. v. Child, _____ _ 
Utah ______ , 247 Pacific 2d, 817 (at page 818). 
Here, there is involved the disputed question of 
whether or not the title of the plaintiff should be quieted 
as against the title of the defendant, and there is a de-
nial by the defendant ( s) of the allegations of plaintiff 
respecting his title. 
Under such circumstances, it has been held in the 
Federal Courts, interpreting a silnilar rule, that : 
"In making a motion for judgn1ent . . . the 
moving party is deemed to have admitted the truth 
of his adversary's allegations and the untruth of 
all of his own allegations which have been denied 
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by the adversary. However, such admission is only 
for the purposes of the motion, and is not final, 
binding, and conclusive, so as to amount to a 
waiver of any material issue. Consequently, the 
fact that the defendant has made such a motion 
did not eliminate all issues of fact so as to author-
ize summary judgment for the plaintiff." M. Snow-
er & Company v. U.S., 7 F.R. Serv. 12c.25, Case 1, 
140 Fed. 2d, 488, as stated in 4 Fed. Rules Digest, 
2d Ed., page 166. 
"Where inconsistent hypotheses might be 
drawn from the facts and the facts reveal aspects 
as to which the minds of reasonable men might 
differ, and there is a substantial controversy as to 
how the parties view their respective rights and 
obligations, the court should not grant summary 
judgment, without making findings of fact and 
conclusions of law." Winter Park Tel. Co. v. 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 F. R. Serv. 56.41, 
Case 2, 181 Fed. 2d, 341, as stated in 4 Fed. Rules 
Digest, 2d Ed., page 161. 
"Summary judgment should be granted only 
if it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is in-
volved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable 
to clarify the application of the law. This is true 
even where there is no dispute as to the evidenti-
ary facts, but only as to the conclusions to be 
drawn therefrom." Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson 
Co., 14 F. R. Serv. 56c.41, Case 3, 181 Fed. 2d, 390, 
as stated 4 Fed. Rules Digest, 2d Ed., page 161. 
In the instant case there is a sharp divergence of 
opinion as to both facts and conclusions to be drawn from 
the same. The date of September lOth, 1856, and the 
question of whether or not there is a showing of title 
prior to that time are the mooted questions, and, even 
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though the facts, as to the ones presented by either plain-
tiff's evidence or defendant's evidence, are admitted or 
undisputed, still, there is a determination of fact to be 
made, whether or not, there was a settlement upon the 
ground in question, under the circumstances required by 
the federal law, prior to the first survey thereof, so as 
to preclude the land over which this litigation is had, 
from being or becoming a school section, and property, 
ultimately of the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff's position, of course, is that the plat of 
"Plot C", so-called (Rec. 66-67), and the notations there-
on (all as more fully set out in argument under Point 
II, hereafter) establish a settlement upon the said lands 
with a view to preemption or homesteading before the 
survey of the lands in the field, on sections 16 or 36, so 
as to subject said sections to the claims of settlers, rather 
than to become school lands. 
It is submitted, that there was a genuine issue of 
fact (or issues of fact), as to whether or not there was 
a settle1nent upon these lands herein involved with a view 
to preemption or homestead, prior to Septe1nber lOth, 
1856 (the date of the field survey acceptance, Rec. 50), 
so as to pre~nt the attachn1ent of the reservation of the 
section in favor of the territorial or state schools. Such 
issue or issues, being real, were to be determined on hear-
ing and trial of the cause, rather than on sun1mary judg-
ment procedure, and, consequently, the trial Court erred 
in so detennining the sa1ne on motion rather than on trial, 
which constituted reversible error on its part, and to 
which exception is taken by appellant herein. 
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POINT II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
QUIETING TITLE IN FAVOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION OF SALT LAKE, INSTEAD OF QUIETING TITLE IN 
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT. 
Chapter 20, Title 43, Section 851, United States 
Code Annotated, entitled, Deficiencies in Grants to State 
by Reason of Settlements, etc., on Designated Sections, 
Generally, reads: 
"Where settlements with a view to preemption 
or homestead, have, been, prior to February 26, 
1859, or shall thereafter be made, before the sur-
vey of the lands in the field, which are found to 
have been made on sections 16 or 36, those sections 
shall be subject to the claims of such settlers, and 
if such sections or either of them shall have been 
or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged, for the 
use of schools or colleges in the State or Territory 
in which they lie, other lands of equal acreage are 
hereby appropriated and granted, and may be se-
lected by said State or Territory, in lieu of such 
as may thus be taken by preemption or homestead 
settlers." 
This is substantially the same language as contained 
in Sections 2275-76, Revised Statutes of the United 
States, 26 Statutes at Large page 796, 51 Congress, Ses-
sion II, adopted February 28th, 1891, which statutes are 
expressly made applicable to the handling of school lands, 
by the Act of ~Iay 3, 1902, Public Law 102, Ch. 183, 32 
Statutes at Large Page 188, 57 Congress, Chapter 683, 
as regards the State of Utah, "anything in the act ap-
proved July 16th, 1894, providing for the admission of 
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said State of Utah to the union, TO THE CONTRARY 
NOT WITHSTANDING." 
Consequently, where there was a settlement WITH 
A VIEW to preemption or homestead, the lands if unsur-
veyed, and later found to be on school sections, never 
became "reserved" for school purposes, within the pro-
visions of Section 15, Organic Act of September 9th, 1850, 
as set forth at Page 34, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, 
which provided: 
"Section 15 : Be it further enacted, That when 
the land in said territory shall be surveyed under 
the direction of the government of the r nited 
States, preparatory to bringing the same into 
market, sections numbered 16 and 36 in each town-
ship in said territory shall be, and the same are 
hereby reserved, for the purpose of being applied 
to the schools in said territory, and in States and 
Territories, hereafter to be erected out of the 
same." 
It is to be particularly noted, that the statute does not 
require "PREEMPTION" or "HOMESTEAD~', as such, 
to withdraw from the purvieu~ of the reservation of 
lands for the schools, said sections 16 or 36, BUT, ONLY 
THAT THERE BE A SETTLEP.fENT WITH A VIEW 
TO HOMESTEAD OR PREEMPTIOl\r. 
AND, IF THAT CONDITIOX BE MET, then the 
lands in question net'er did become the property of either 
the territory, under section 15 of the Organic Act, or, of 
the State, 1rhen it acceded to the rig·hts of the territorial 
government, and there would be no succession in the State 
of Utah, to the grant of those lands. 
10 
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It might be appropriate to point out here, also, that 
while preemption was an act toward perfecting the title 
to lands and obtaining the same from the federal govern-
ment under the various land laws, and perhaps necessary 
as between possessors or settlers, both claiming the same 
ground, that even this Court, in construing Federal Court 
Decisions on the nmtter, commented, as in Hamblin v. 
State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 
Pac. 178, as respects Section 2266, Revised Statutes of 
United States, 1878, relating to the necessity for 
filing a preemption right within three months from date 
of receipt of the approved plat of the land that might 
be claimed, at the district land office, that : 
"In construing the section of the act of Con-
gress above quoted, as far as we have been able 
to ascertain, th~e Courts have uniformly held it 
to be directory only." Quoting Landsdale v. Dan-
iels, 100 U.S. 113, 25 L. Ed. 587; Johnson v. Tow-
sley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. Ed. 485; Hollingshead v. 
Simms, 51 Cal. 188, etc., "Our investigation of 
this question fails to discover any case in conflict 
with these decisions, nor does there appear to be 
any logical reason against the doctrine therein 
announced." 
Coming now to the situation disclosed by the plain-
tiff's facts and theory-of-the case, we find: 
(a) Land Certificate by Jesse W. Fox, Territorial 
Surveyer, issued to John Prye (name miscopied into 
later county records as "John Poy," and the description 
as Block 15, instead of Block 13, see Rec. 65, Certified 
copy of Abstract Record Page giving correct details as 
11 
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to name ,and block, and Rec. 68-9, Certified Copy of 
Book B-8, page 137, showing name and lots involved), on 
February 25th, 1868, and recorded March 9th, 1868, (Ex-
hibit 1, Page 1). No controversy exists as to the correct-
ness of the name or description of the ground. 
By virtue of an act of the Utah Territorial Legisla-
ture Approved January 9th, 1866, Mr. John Prye was es-
tablished ,as the person holding "title of possession," of 
the said ground herein in controversy. The provisions 
of said act are, as found on page 95, Compile~ Laws of 
Utah, 1876, as follows: 
"(68) Section 1: Be it enacted by the Gov-
ernor and Legislative Assembly of the Territory 
of Utah: That the surveyor general is hereby au-
thorized and required to give, to the person for 
whom he-- makes ,a survey, a certificate thereof, 
describing the tract, block, or lot, and specifying 
its area, such certificate SHALL BE TITLE OF 
POSSESSION TO THE PERSON HOLDING 
IT." 
This possession, invested in Mr. John Prye, in 1868, has 
through intermediate conveyances, down to the present 
time, been carried over to the plaintiff and appellant 
herein, and no act of divesture has ever been shown to 
have taken pl,ace. 
But, inherent in this very procedure which estab-
lished l\1r. John Prye as the title holder of possession 
of the ground in 1868, is the inference that he must have 
been in possession prior to the date when the survey 
certificate was rnade, in order to have had the survey 
12 
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made, and the facts necessary for the surveyor general 
to know, ascertained. So, we may indulge in the presump-
tion that Mr. Prye was in possession and on the ground 
prior to February 25th, 1868. 
It is well known to title examiners, that the early 
recordings of deeds and transfers and the like relating to 
lands, were not made with the nicety that we observe 
today, and, that there are, as far as the county records 
are concerned, many gaps in titles prior to and during 
the period of 1860 to 1870 or thereabouts. So, that it is 
quite possible that Mr. Prye obtained his possession from 
some earlier or original settler on the ground. Which 
latter fact brings us to : 
(b) The certified copy of the so-called "Plot 'C' " 
(Rec. 66-67), obtained from the Salt L.ake County Record-
er's Office, and containing on the one sheet, a showing 
of the linear outlines of the lots, blocks, and parts of Plot 
"C" [covering the property herein in dispute], and a 
further sheet showing what is an ownership plat, with 
each lot being marked with a name or names, as owners. 
In respect to Lots 16 and 17, Block 13, we find the name 
"D. Hendrix," appearing as the lot owner or holder. But, 
the most significant thing about the instrument in ques-
tion, is that it bears the notation that it was: 
"COPIED FROM OLD PLOT BY LEO HAWKINS, 
G.S.L. CO. Recorder, -1857." 
Obviously, if the Plot was copied from an "old" plot 
in 1857, the original must have been older, at least, than 
the date of December 31st, 1857, and the question arises 
13 
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as to how "old was old." By dictionary definition, the 
term "old" has been said to mean: 
"1. Having existed for a long time; aged;" 
"3. Having been used or known for a long time." 
Now, let us apply the term to the situation then 
existing. Utah was in a sense, a new country, having 
been settled in 1847, yet as a decade had elapsed since 
its settlement, much had been accomplished. So, in 1857, 
the copied "plot" being from an "old" plot, relatively, 
might go back as far as ten years. If the "plot" referred 
to as the original fron1 which the copying had been done, 
had been made in 1857, it would hardly have been referred 
to as "old," nor, would there have been any need for an 
immediate recopying of the same, and, inserting the 
ownership names thereon would take some time, too, 
so, it would appear that the "old" plot would antedate 
the year 1857. From the "plot" itself, (Rec. 66-67), it 
would appear that the land was laid out in blocks, lots, 
and tr.acts, and, that same was based on some kind of a 
survey that had been made to lay out that land known or 
to be known as Plat or Plot "C." Since, a survey could 
not be made without expenditure of some time, and, as 
it would take time, after survey of the same to compile 
the ownership data, or indeed, to permit transfer to ,as 
many individuals as appear to be owners thereon, and, 
as, surveying would be unlikely during the wintertime, it 
would appear to have been n1ade earlier, at least, than 
the fall of 1856, in order to be within the we.ather limits 
of 1856 season, and the tilne basis in 1naking it up. And, 
yet, in considering how far we n1ust push back to find 
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the extent of the world "old," it would appear that at 
most, we need set back the time to cover only the time 
to a day prior to September lOth, 1856, a matter of less 
than four months, to bring the time when settlement on 
the land with a view to homesteading or preemption, 
would give the settlers priority over any reservation for 
school usages, since the survey would not then have been 
completed. Surely, it would not be unreasonable to extend 
the meaning of the word "old" a few months to bring it 
ahead of the date of September lOth, 1856, when the plat 
now in the land office as the survey of that section 16, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 East, S.alt Lake Meridian 
was approved. 
Nor, can it be doubted, if the land was laid out in-
to lots, blocks, and like, with spacing intervening for 
streets or approaches, that there was no intent not to 
homestead or preempt the land, in order to perfect title. 
But, as before noted, there was no requirement of an 
ACTUAL PREEMPTION, or IMMEDIATE HOME-
STEADING, but, only WITH A VIEW TO THE SAME. 
Now, if the land had been surveyed "AFTER" settle-
ment with a view to preemption or homestead, WOULD 
IT BE LIKELY that the same would be divided into 
lots, blocks, streets, and the like, when the contempary 
people had the advantage of knowing the reservations 
in Section 15 of the Organic Act creating the Territory 
of Utah, making this school land~ Indeed, it would be 
most unlikely for them to go on through all the motions 
that they did to plat the land, divide it up, sell, or 
trade the sa1ne, knowing all the time, (if their actions 
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were assumed to take place after September lOth, 1856) 
that it was school land, and could never be theirs? 
Futility was not the habit of the pioneers, and the very 
list of names on the ownership plat would militate against 
any such a useless proceeding. The very consideration 
of the situation shows its absurdity, and, makes obvious 
the only sensible conclusion, which is that the parties did 
know what they were doing, that it was not futile, and 
it did antedate September lOth, 1856. In the absence 
of contrary information, we must assume that what the 
settlers did was legal, and, that they did not take action 
for the purposes of usurping school lands that might 
inure to the benefit of the territory. There is every pre-
sumption as to legality and regularity of their acts. 
And, of course, as shown by the record (Rec. 71, 72, 
73, 7 4, 75) other areas of the same section 16, of Town-
ship 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake :Meridian, were 
patented under homestead entry, and the title of the 
settler or settlers perfected, which would certainly nega-
tive the idea that the title of the territory or of the state 
was so firmly attached to these lands that any other pros-
pective settler was forever excluded therefrom, insofar as 
getting title was concerned. Certainly, the general land 
office in \V ashington would not have let slip by patent 
proceedings to land "reserved" for the territory, with-
out a proper showing that the reservation was indeed 
ineffective in smne manner as to the land in question. 
The record also shows that the state went further and 
selected lieu lands for those patented under the proceed-
ings above mentioned. 
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The case of Ferry vs. Street, as reported in 11 
Pacific Reporter, 571, 4 Utah, 521 (1888), is interesting 
in this respect, as showing that title to unsurveyed sec-
tions, if settlement thereon was made before date of 
survey, and same by the survey were determined to be 
school sections, was nevertheless retained in the settlers, 
and school title reservations did not attach; and that 
the same was true, even of sections which because of 
the survey of adjacent sections could almost be bounded 
by reason of the corners of the adjacent sections being 
fixed. Actual survey was required. 
It is of no avail for defendant and respondent to 
argue that the present title may still be in the United 
States, and, that for any of a number of various reasons 
it is not, or should not be in the plaintiff and appellant. 
For, in a quiet title action, it is so well settled as not to 
need citation here and now, that the party recovering 
must recover upon the strength of his own title, not 
upon any weaknesses of his adversary's title. Yet, 
through just such inferences, the trial courut was lured 
into its erroneous decision in favor of the defendant 
Board of Education of Salt Lake; whereas, the truth 
of the matter is, because of the matters relating to title 
as above set forth, that insofar as the Lots 16 and 17, 
of Block 13, of Five Acre Plat C, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, are concerned, they never were school land, nor 
were they reserved for such purposes, hence did not pass 
to the State of Utah, and so its purported grant to 
Romney Lumber Company. a corporation, who conveyed 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 
is of no effect, and, the title of plaintiff and appellant 
should be quieted as against pretensions of any of the 
defendants and respondents, claiming under such in-
valid grant by the State of Utah. Failure so to decree 
constitutes reversible error. 
Once the adverse interest of defendants and re-
spondents is quieted in favor of appellant herein, he 
can, of course, proceed under Section 1068, United States 
Code Annotated, as amended, to secure title as an ad-
verse holder of the land for more than 20 years, or for 
a period commencing not later than January 1st, 1901, 
(Section 10, USCA, Title 43, Page 64 Cumulative An-
naual Pocket Part), .and, in such connection no preemp-
tion, homestead, or the like is required, and, there are 
no questions of transfer of possessory rights, or the 
like, or any inability or restriction to so do involved. 
CONCLUSION 
It was therefore, it is respectfully submitted, and as 
set out in Points I and II of the argument, hereinabove, 
error on the p.art of the trial court to decide the case 
on motion for summary judgment, and to give judgment 
for the defendant-respondent, Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City, and to dis1niss the plaintiff-appellant's 
complaint without granting hiln the relief sought by him 
quieting his title to said ground. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff and appellant prays 
this Honerable Court to reverse the holding of the trial 
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court, and to remand the same for further proceedings 
in accordance with the principles set forth herein, or, for 
the Supreme Court to find for the appellant-plaintiff, 
and, enter a proper decree and judgment in his favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. S. JOHNSON 
Attorney-for-Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
